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Abstract—The out-of-gas error occurs when smart contract
programs are provided with inputs that cause excessive gas con-
sumption, and would be easily exploited to make the DoS attack.
Multiple approaches have been proposed to estimate the gas limit
of a function in smart contracts to avoid such error. However,
under estimation often happens when the contract is complicated.
In this work, we propose GasFuzz, which could automatically
generate inputs that maximizes the gas cost and reduce the under
estimation cases. GasFuzz is designed based on feedback-directed
mutational fuzz testing. First, GasFuzz builds the gas weighted
control flow graph (CFG) of functions in smart contracts. Then,
GasFuzz develops gas consumption guided selection and mutation
strategies to generate the input that maximize the gas consump-
tion. For evaluation, we implement GasFuzz based on js-evm,
a widely used ethereum virtual machine written in javascript,
and conduct experiments on 736 real-world transactions recorded
on Ethereum. 44.02% of the transactions would have out-of-gas
errors under the estimation results given by solc, means that the
recorded real gas consumption for those recorded transactions is
larger than the gas limit value estimated by solc. While GasFuzz
could reduce the under estimation ratio to 13.86%. Compared
with other well-known feedback-directed fuzzing engines such
as PerFuzz and SlowFuzz, GasFuzz can generate a same or
higher gas estimation value on 97.8% of the recorded transactions
with less time, usually within 5 minutes. Furthermore, GasFuzz
has exposed 25 previously unknown out-of-gas vulnerabilities in
those widely-used smart contracts, 5 of which have been assigned
unique CVE identifiers in the US National Vulnerability Database.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to avoid excessive consumption of resources, users
will be charged with gas to execute smart contracts [22]. Gas
cost is determined by the amount of resources consumed by
computation and storage. [8][30]. Meanwhile, users may set
a gas limit for each transaction to prevent potential malicious
gas consumption. But if a transaction needs more gas than
the limit set by the user, an out-of-gas error occurs and the
transaction would fail. As a result, the transaction would be
reverted and the gas spent on executing the transaction is
wasted. Malicious users may provide specially crafted inputs
to trigger a high-gas cost transactions to launch a Denial-of-
Service(DoS) attack [1]. Indeed, the out-of-gas error happens
frequently. We investigated transactions made from 2:00 to
3:00 on May 1st, 2019 on Ethereum and found that 21 of
them have out-of-gas errors. Gas waste caused by these failed
transactions accounts for 5.64% of all gas consumption.
Extensive research has focused on how to estimate the
gas limit of smart contract functions to avoid this error. For
example, Solc [28], a widely-used compiler for smart contracts
written in solidity language, provides a gas cost estimating
tool to give a predication on the gas consumption for each
function. It statically analyzes each contract function and
provides an estimation based on the opcodes contained in the
function. Marescotti et al. [45] present a symbolic execution
method to estimate gas cost. The inputs triggering the gas
cost could be achieved by solving the equations generated
by the constraints for each program path. Although those
works solve the problem to some extent, but in practice, their
reference value is limited and users have to set the gas limit
with manually evaluation. For instance, solc often estimates
the gas consumption to be ‘infinite’ or under estimated values.
The path conditions of symbolic based estimators are often
complex to be solved and most of the results are incorrect.
In fact, finding out how many gas units used in a transac-
tion is hard before the transaction is really executed. There
are mainly two challenges. First, the gas consumption of
a transaction comes from not only the gas charged by the
opcodes, but also the gas used in data storage. It is usually
not easy to estimate the data storage with static analysis and
solve the complex data structure with symbolic techniques.
Furthermore, a function which contains many branches may
behave differently under different block states or with different
inputs. It is often infeasible to generate some inputs manually
which could consume some certain units of gas.
In this paper, we propose GasFuzz, a method that can
automatically generate inputs which could lead to a high
gas consumption of contract functions and reduce the under
estimation ratio of existing works. GasFuzz is designed based
on feedback-directed fuzz testing. Specifically, GasFuzz uses
three steps to generate inputs: 1) Weighted control flow graph
(W-CFG) generation, 2) Feedback-directed selection and muta-
tion, 3) Contract execution. The first step generates a W-CFG
for the contract, where each node in the CFG has a weight
representing the gas cost of the node. The second step selects
the seeds based on the feedback information including the
coverage and gas consumption, and defines several mutators
for selected seeds. The third step executes the functions with
the mutated seeds and calculates the gas consumption of nodes
and edges in W-CFG. The key idea behind GasFuzz is that the
goal of finding out-of-gas vulnerabilities can be posed as an
optimization problem whose goal is to find a set of inputs that
maximizes gas consumption of a target smart contract function.
For evaluation, we implemented GasFuzz based on js-evm,
one of the widely-used Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) for
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the execution of smart contracts. We conduct experiments on
1000 real-world transactions recorded on Ethereum, where
contracts used by 736 transactions could be compiled suc-
cessfully. If we set the gas limit according to the limit value
estimated by solc, 44.02% of the transactions will have out-
of-gas errors, meaning that the recorded real gas consumption
value is larger than the estimated value. There are also 33.43%
of the transactions will be evaluated to be ‘infinite’ by solc,
which may mislead the users to set a higher gas limit and drag
the execution process of the transaction. While GasFuzz could
reduce the under-estimation ratio to 13.86%, and can also ex-
pose meaningful reference value for all the ‘infinite’ excessive
gas estimation situations by solc. We also compared GasFuzz
with other well-known feedback-directed fuzzing tools such as
SlowFuzz [52] and PerFuzz [40]. The results show that Gas-
Fuzz outperforms others. In particular, GasFuzz can generate
a same or higher gas estimation on 97.8% of transactions with
less time, usually within 5 minutes. Besides, GasFuzz found
25 previous unknown gas-related vulnerabilities in widely-
used real world contracts which could lead to a Denial-of-
Service attack, 5 of which have been assigned unique CVE
identifiers in the US National Vulnerability Database and other
20 are appended for approval. In general, this work makes the
following contributions:
1) We design and implement GasFuzz, a feedback-directed
fuzzing approach that could generate inputs triggering a
high-gas cost of smart contracts, and reduce the under
estimation ratio of existing works.
2) We show two practical applications of GasFuzz. First,
GasFuzz can be used to provide guidance on setting the
gas limit to prevent potential out-of-gas errors. Second,
GasFuzz could be used to reveal gas-related vulnerabili-
ties of existing contracts and settings. We have found 25
confirmed vulnerabilities, and 5 of which with CVE IDs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we introduce the background of blockchain and provide a
high-level overview of GasFuzz with a motivating example. We
formally describe the design of GasFuzz in Section 3. Section 4
demonstrates the evaluation results. Section 5 represents some
limitations of GasFuzz. In Section 6, we introduce some other
related works. Section 7 makes a conclusion.
II. OVERVIEW
A. Background of Blockchain and Gas
Blockchain is a distributed system widely used in all walks
of life. This is a new application mode of computer technology
including distributed data storage, point-to-point transmis-
sion, consensus mechanism, encryption algorithm and so on.
Blockchain technology uses consensus mechanism to ensure
that transactions are traceable. Meanwhile, the transactions
on blockchain system could not be tempered with arbitrarily.
In the aspect of privacy protection, blockchain technology
uses many encryption algorithms to protect user’s transaction
data. Ethereum is a successful practice of blockchain sys-
tem. In the original Bitcoin system, users could only make
system-specified transactions, such as buying Bitcoin. In the
Ethereum system, the user’s freedom of action has been greatly
improved. Developers can develop their own applications in
Ethereum for publication. The applications deployed in the
Ethereum is consists of smart contracts. Smart contract is writ-
ten in Turing-completed language such as solidity. Ethereum
also provides a virtual machine to execute the solidity code.
The Ethereum Virtual Machine, also known as EVM, could
recognize the binary code of the smart contracts as some
opcodes, and execute the opcodes one by one.
Gas is a unit used to measure the workload of an operation
in Ethereum. If an operation consumes more resources, it
consumes more gas. This mechanism ensures that resources are
not maliciously wasted. In the actual payment of gas costs, the
amount of tokens consumed will be determined by the gas unit
cost and the current price of gas. During the actual execution
of the transaction, users will set up a maximum gas unit willing
to pay for the transaction, which is called the gas limit. If the
gas actually consumed by the transaction is larger than the gas
limit, the execution of the entire transaction will fail, which is
called an out-of-gas exception. Fig 1 represents a work flow
of gas mechanism in Ethereum.
Fig. 1: Gas Mechanism in Ethereum, where miners will keep
the gas though the transaction is not completed
It’s not good if an out-of-gas error happens, because the
miners will still charge the users for gas though the transaction
was not completed. However, it is also bad to set a very high
gas limit. Due to the limitation of block gas limit, the miners
preferred transactions with a low gas limit. A high gas limit
will drag on the speed of completing the transaction. Besides,
a high gas limit setting, which allows more opcodes executing,
may give some attackers a chance to commit an attack.
B. A Motivating Example
In this work, given a function in a smart contract, we aim to
help users set gas limits more accurately, so as to avoid out-of-
gas errors. There are two kinds of gas consumption mechanism
in Ethereum, which are known as the execution gas cost and
the transaction gas cost. The execution gas cost is based on
the cost of computational operations which are executed as a
result of the transaction. The transaction gas cost is based on
the cost of sending data to the blockchain. There are 4 items
which make up the full transaction cost: 1) the base cost of a
transaction (which is 21,000 gas units); 2) the cost of a contract
deployment (only charged on construct functions, 32,000 gas
units); 3) the cost for every zero byte of data or code for a
transaction; 4) the cost of every non-zero byte of data or code
for a transaction. Given a trace of a smart contract, we can
identify its gas cost by accumulating the gas consumption of
each step. The problem is thus to identify the most gas-costing
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traces. Given that the gas cost is path-based property, as far
as we know, existing methods (e.g., fuzzing with the objective
of maximizing branch coverage, static analysis or symbolic
execution) are not effective on solving the problem. So we try
to design trace-based feedback guided fuzzing technique.
In order to understand how our trace based technique
works, let us consider a contract deployed on the Ethereum.
The following code is intercepted from the contract [29]
which is used to distribute tokens. The function we focus on
is distributeFixed. This function transfers a fixed amount of
ethers to each account that needs to be rewarded. Since this
contract was deployed on Ethereum, 52 transactions have been
made. Among these transactions, 80.77% of them are executed
successfully, and 15.38% of the transactions failed because
of out-of-gas error. All the out-of-gas transactions called the
function distributeFixed. The function is shown as below:
1 contract DistributeTokens is Ownable{
2 ...
3 function distributeFixed
4 (address[] _addrs, uint _amoutToEach) onlyOwner{
5 /* _addrs is an array of address input by the user */
6 for(uint i = 0; i < _addrs.length; ++i){
7 /* transfer some token to each address */
8 tokenReward.transfer(_addrs[i],_amoutToEach);
9 }
10 }
11 ...
12 }
If we use the gas estimation tool provided by solc to
estimate the gas cost of this function, the result is ‘infinite’.
The main source of gas consumption in distributeFixed is the
transfer at line 5. The transfer function is implemented based
on the opcode CALL. CALL has a multi-part gas cost: 1) the
basic gas cost is 700 units; 2) If the transferring value is non-
zero, another 9000 gas units are charged; 3) If the destination
account does not yet exist, another 25000 gas units are charged.
This is the gas consumption of opcodes. In a real transaction,
the memory used to store the transaction data on Ethereum
also requires gas. We fetched 3 real transactions based on this
function from Etherscan[37]. The inputs of the transactions
and the results of gas used are shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Inputs for distributeFixed
The first transaction has 102 transfers. The gas limit set by
users is 447,000 units. This transaction failed because of an
out-of-gas error. The second transaction also has 100 ERC-20
transfers. The inputs of this transaction are the same as the
first transaction. The user would like to try a higher gas limit
for the transaction but significantly under-approximate the gas
consumption and, as a result, the transaction also failed. The
third transaction has 100 ERC-20 transfers from the contract
account to 100 other accounts, the amount in the transaction
is 100 gwei. The gas cost of the transaction with this set
of input is 3,215,590 units. This transaction is successfully
executed. The first two transactions cost 1,047,000 units of
gas in total. According to the setting of gas price in these two
transactions, 31,857,000 gwei is charged by these transactions.
That means nearly six dollars are wasted in vain after these
transactions. These out-of-gas errors would not occur if the
user knows in advance how many gas will be consumed
by this function and what are the inputs to trigger the gas
consumption. GasFuzz addresses exactly this concern.
C. Gas Fuzzing Idea
Let us look at the original control flow graph of the
function distributeFixed presented in Fig. 3. The transfer
process needs many parameters, the complex sequences of
opcodes are simplified in this figure to explain how GasFuzz
works. Because of the long trace as shown in the CFG, it is
infeasible to use existing symbolic execution based tools to
get an accurate value of gas consumption of this function.
As mentioned above, static analysis based tools result in
an estimation of ‘infinite’. In contrast, GasFuzz applies a
feedback-guided fuzzing techniques to identify an accurate gas
estimation. The main idea of GasFuzz is to reserve the seeds
that could cost more gas units on some of the statements in a
given function to trigger a high gas consumption.
Fig. 3: The Control Flow Graph for function distibuteFixed
We assume that the initial inputs of this function is the
same as the third transaction in Fig. 2. GasFuzz would set up
an initial environment and execute the function with the initial
inputs. The initial inputs would execute edge E1, E2 and E4
for 81 times. GasFuzz will record the gas cost on each edge
of the CFG as well as the total gas cost of the transaction.
The initial inputs are reserved in the seeds pool for further
mutation. At each iteration, GasFuzz picks an input from the
seeds pool and randomly mutate it with several mutators.
3
Fig. 4: GasFuzz architecture, which consists of: W-CFG Generation, Mutation and Environment Setup. The inputs of GasFuzz
are the smart contract, while the outputs are the value of gas cost and the inputs that could trigger the cost.
As Table I shows, let us assume that the first mutated seed
is Input2. GasFuzz will use the new input to run the function,
the gas cost of this input only executes the edge E1, E2 and E4
for 32 times. The gas costs on these edges are not increased
with the new input, and the total gas cost is not increased either,
so it will be abandoned by GasFuzz. Let us further assume that
the next input is Input3. With this input, the edges E1, E2 and
E4 are executed for 100 times. The gas cost of these edges are
increased, and this input will be reserved in the seeds pool by
GasFuzz. The gas cost for each edge and the total gas cost are
updated. As for Input 4, the edges are executed for 100 times
as well, but if the total gas cost is increased, GasFuzz will keep
it into the seeds pool as well. All of the reserved inputs will
be mutated to generate new inputs. From all of the alternative
inputs, GasFuzz will choose several ones which have the most
gas cost of the whole function as the basic input to be mutated.
In this way, GasFuzz always keeps the inputs that could trigger
a local higher gas cost or a global higher gas cost and makes
mutations based on these inputs.
TABLE I: Overview of the input mutation for GasFuzz
Input_Num _addr.length _amount edge_exe_times
Input1 81 100 eth 81
Input2 32 231 eth 32
Input3 100 109 eth 32
Input4 100 31 eth 32
In this contract, if the length of the address array is
larger, the transaction will make more transfer operations and
consume more gas, eventually exceed the gas limit of a block
which is 80,039,143 units [27]. GasFuzz generated sets of
inputs that trigger a high gas cost which exceeds the gas limit.
Malicious attackers may exploit this to implement an attack.
The vulnerability has been assigned with a CVE Id CVE-XX-
XX (hidden because of the double-blind review mechanism). A
more thorough analysis of GasFuzz’s performance on various
smart contracts will be presented in Section IV.
III. GASFUZZ DESIGN
GasFuzz uses three steps to generate inputs to maxmize
the gas cost: 1) Weighted control flow graph (W-CFG) gener-
ation, 2) Feedback-directed mutation and selection, 3) Contract
execution. The architecture of GasFuzz is shown in Fig4.
GasFuzz starts the fuzzing process with a binary file (.bin)
and application binary interface file (.abi) of the contract.
GasFuzz extracts the types of parameters and randomly gen-
erates some initial inputs for contracts and generates some
initial environment variables. Besides, GasFuzz deploys the
contract and prepares some function runners for execution.
GasFuzz uses the first input to run, and calculates the gas
cost information for each edge in W-CFG. After the execution,
the seed and feedback information are passed to the feedback-
directed selection and mutation part. The feedback information
determines whether the seed is saved or not. All the saved
seeds are mutated under GasFuzz mutation strategies. After
the mutation, GasFuzz selects one seed from the queue and
pass it to the function runners. This is a cyclic process and
Gasfuzz only stops when the user forces it to stop with time
or value thresholds.
A. W-CFG Generation
GasFuzz defines a weighted control flow graph which gives
a gas consumption weight to each node contained in the
traditional CFG. Each node of the CFG is a sequential non-
branching block of opcodes. If there is a JUMP opcode or
JUMPI opcode, CFG will have a new branch. The weight
of the node represents the gas cost of the node. As for the
gas cost of some opcodes determined by the operands, a node
may have an uncertain gas cost. If the node has an uncertain
gas cost, weight of this node is defined as gas consumption
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values excluding uncertainties. A simple W-CFG generated by
GasFuzz is presented in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5: Example of W-CFG, each block has an initial gas
costs. When there is a JUMP or JUMPI opcode, there is a
new branch.
As we could see from the W-CFG presented above, each
node has some opcodes, and an initial gas consumption value.
If the gas consumption of a node is not fixed, the initial
gas consumption of the node will be the minimum value of
the node. The W-CFG has a new branch when encounter
with a JUMP or JUMPI opcode. JUMP opcode takes one
parameter from the stack as the destination. JUMPI opcode
takes two parameters. The first parameter is the destination
and the second one is the condition. As for this example,
the destination of the JUMPI in the first node is ‘0d’ which
is pushed into the stack in the first PUSH opcode. The
condition of this JUMPI is the msg.value which is pushed
by CALLVALUE opcode. If msg.value is 0, JUMPI will add
the program counter by 1. If msg.value is not 0, JUMPI will
jump to address 17. Each edge in the W-CFG has an initial gas
consumption of 0. The gas consumption of an edge is defined
as the total units of gas cost of the root node of this edge in
the execution process.
B. Feedback-directed selection and mutation
Feedback-directed fuzzing is the kernel component of
GasFuzz. It keeps collecting feedback information during test
case execution and using the feedback to optimize the fuzzing
process, by selecting the right seeds for generating new test
cases. Seeds selection determines whether a seed is a good
one, and seeds mutation determines the how the selected seeds
change for the next execution process. Algorithm 1 outlines
the feed-back directed selection and mutation for GasFuzz.
GasFuzz will keep running until the duration time set by the
user is up or the user would like to stop the process.
Seeds Selection. GasFuzz could generate an initial input
according to the types of parameters in smart contracts’ func-
tions. The initial inputs are put into the contract functions for
the first execution. The feedback information of the execution,
Algorithm 1: Feedback-directed selection and muta-
tion process
Input : initial_inputs
1 select_seed = initial_inputs;
2 old_feedBack = function.execute(select_inputs);
3 SeedsPool.push(initial_inputs);
4 repeat
5 foreach strategy of mutation_strategies do
6 newSeed = mutate(original_seed, strategy);
7 newSeed.change_Array();
8 new_seeds.push(newSeed);
9 end
10 foreach seed of new_seeds do
11 feedBack = function.execute(seed);
12 if feedBack.isInteresting(old_feedfack) then
13 SeedsPool.push(seed);
14 old_feedback = feedBack;
15 end
16 select_seed = select(SeedsPool);
17 until Duration_timeIsUp() || UserStop();
Output: Inputs that lead to a high gas cost or
Warnings
which contains gas cost and the number of times each edge
is exercised, and the total gas cost, is stored by GasFuzz. The
initial seed is mutated then under several mutation operators.
The mutated inputs are put into the function again. If the inputs
could cost more gas of the function or hits more times of some
edges in W-CFG, the inputs are defined as interesting seeds and
would be reserved. The selection process could be represented
as the following:
{s|S, total(s) > totalcur}∪
{s|S,∃e : E cost(s, e) > costcur(e)}
where E represents the set of edges in the W-CFG, s represents
seeds, and total represents the total gas cost of the transaction.
All interesting seeds are stored in a priority queue called seeds
pool. Seeds that consume more gas are assigned with higher
priority. Each iteration, GasFuzz picks a seed from the queue
to mutate, and puts the mutated seed into the function again.
GasFuzz repeats the above process iteratively.
For the local optimum problem, it occurs when a node does
not has an growth on its gas consumption, which hinders the
execution of its subsequent nodes which may lead to a high gas
consumption. In order to tackle with this problem, GasFuzz
uses an sampling algorithm similar to MCMC [56] in seed
selector which is implemented in the function isInteresting in
the algorithm above. In this way, GasFuzz saves those none-
interesting seeds with a probability and successfully avoid the
local optimal problems.
Seeds Mutation. Seeds mutation operators of GasFuzz
could be divided in two groups: 1) Traditional mutation. For
mutating common inputs of functions, we defined several
mutators which are adopted from AFL [33]. Each selected
seed is mutated using the mutation operators. The mutators we
adopt include bit flipping, byte flipping, arithmetic increment
and decrement of integer values, replacing of bytes with
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interesting integer values (0, MAX_INT), etc. 2) Gas-cost-
specific mutation. The second group of the mutation operators
are used for mutating some special type of variables such as
arrays. The length of an array variable may affect the times of
the execution of some loops in a function. More loops means
more gas consumption somehow. An array variable is replaced
by a new array with a different length and different elements.
The elements of the array are generated randomly according to
the type of the parameters, and the length is randomly selected.
The seed in GasFuzz is represented as a gene chain, which
contains all bytes of the function inputs in one contract.
GasFuzz defines a gene_map to match the inputs for each
parameter of each function. Besides, smart contracts need some
state information to run. GasFuzz defines state variables as
new functions and connects them with the original functions
in the contract. The inputs of the functions are state variables.
GasFuzz will generate new state variables with the same
strategies as other inputs and store them in the gene chain.
C. Contract Execution
The input of GasFuzz is the abi file and binary file of a
smart contract. Construction of an environment and several
runners for a contract to run is essential. The environment of
GasFuzz is a simulation one which contains the same features
as the Ethereum environment. For each contract, the first step is
to deploy the contract, that is, to execute the construct function
of the contract. The construct process is done by executing the
binary code compiled from the contract source code with on
the Ethereum virtual machine. After one contract has been
deployed, GasFuzz generates a runner for each function. This
runner contains the signature of the function and each input for
the function. With the help of the runner, GasFuzz will find
the matching piece of bytecode from the bin file according
to the signature of the function. The signature of a function
is a string that only related to the name and the inputs of a
function. The number of inputs and their types are extracted
by GasFuzz from the abi file, and recorded in the runner of
function. Ethereum virtual machine could run a transaction
easily with the parameters provided by these drivers. To startup
the fuzzing process, an initial seed is also needed. The initial
seed is generated by the abi file of the contract. A map is used
to record the mapping relation between the formal parameter
and the actual parameter stored in the seed.
For detail implementation, GasFuzz is based on js-evm,
and relays on several open-source programs such as solidity-
types[24], to accomplish the whole task. types to generate a
variable for a certain type in smart contracts. In the following,
we mainly describe some implementation details for mutation
part and environment variables definition part.
The seed is represented as a variable called gene in our
implementation. A gene stores all of the inputs of the functions
in one contract. Another structure named gene_map is used
to fetch seeds for each input parameter of a function. For
each input of the function defined in the contract, GasFuzz
fetches the name of the function, the length of the inputs, the
name of the input and the type of the input as the components
to generate a key. The key is used to get the seed from the
gene_map. For each input, we use an open-source tool called
’solidity-types’ to generate a random value according to the
type of the parameter. The value is represented as a buffer and
connected to the variable gene. The starting position and the
ending position of the value in the gene are recorded in the
gene_map. By this way, we generate random values for the
inputs and maintain a structure to effectively get the values.
As for the environment variables, we define the following
variables in GasFuzz: the coinbase of a block as an address
variable; the difficulty of a block as an integer; the block
number as an integer; the block timestamp as an integer; the
sender as an address; the original address of a transaction
named tx.origin as an address.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate GasFuzz to answer the fol-
lowing four questions: a) Is out-of-gas a real threat? b) Is
GasFuzz capable of generating inputs that approximate
the gas limit for a given smart contract function? c)
What advantages does GasFuzz have compared with other
feedback-directed fuzzing tools? d) Is GasFuzz able to be
applied in the practical use?
All our experiments were performed on a machine with
126GB memory, equipped with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold
6148 CPU @ 2.40GHz and running 64-bit Linux operating
system. All of the 255 real world contracts used in our
experiment are compiled by solc version 0.4.26. We took
1000 recorded transactions randomly from Etherscan[37] for
all of the following experiments. We used solc to compile all
these contracts and contracts used by 736 transactions could
be compiled successfully. The other contracts could not be
compiled because of the version of the compiler. It’s necessary
to mention here that some of the tools referred in related
work are not available at present, so we will not compare
GasFuzz with them in the following experiments, but with the
most widely used solc and reward-directed fuzzing such as
SlowFuzz and PerFuzz.
A. Risks of out-of-gas error
Because of the fact that lots of users of smart contracts use
the estimation tool of solc to set the gas limit when they made
a transaction, we use the result of solc to investigate the current
level of out-of-gas risk. Fig.6 shows a comparison between the
gas used of these transactions and the gas estimation results
of the tool in solc. We use ‘diff’ to express this contrast. As
shown in the following formula:
diff = solcest(function)− real_cost(trans)
where ‘diff’ represents the difference between the gas es-
timation of solc and the gas units actually consumed by
the recorded transaction. In Fig 6, the X-axis represents the
interval where ‘diff’ is located, and the Y-axis represents the
number of transactions in that interval. The red bar represents
the case where the ‘diff’ is negative, and the blue bar represents
the case where the ’diff’ is positive. We use 0 to represent the
‘infinite’ estimation given by solc. As the result shows, if
the users use the estimation results of solc to set the gas
limit, out-of-gas error is likely to happen. In particular,
44.02% of the transactions will be out-of-gas, and 33.43%
of the transactions will evaluated to be ‘infinite’ without
meaningful guidance.
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Fig. 6: Risks of out-of-gas error with the results of solc
.
We chose the most representative 8 functions from the 255
contracts involved in the transactions as illustrative examples
to show the detail situations. The 8 functions are with the
top most probability of out-of-gas error and are from different
contracts. The functions’ details and the gas estimation results
of them are listed in Table II. The column Trans represents the
number of transactions that called this function. solc column
shows the estimation result of solc. Column real represents the
recorded maximum cost of the executed transactions based on
this function.
TABLE II: Chosen functions’ details, and their estimation of
gas cost by solc and recorded real gas cost.
Contract Function Trans solc real
BAToken transfer 1 43517 21916
DSTokenBase transfer 1 43919 37175
Dogg transfer 2 45216 52835
AccessoryData addSERAPHIM 1 41921 49816
ENIGMA Activate 5 infinite 25689
KittyItemMarket additem 8 infinite 113844
CommunityChest send 8 infinite 32523
Future1Exchange admin_token_withdraw 4 infinite 31484
If users set gas limit according to the results of solc,
93.3% transactions based on the 8 contracts will have out-of-
gas problems or infinite limit. The under estimation is mainly
because the gas estimation tool in solc uses static analysis
to calculate the gas consumption of all opcodes. solc does not
consider the gas consumption caused by data storage during the
execution of transactions, which results in the estimation bias
compared with the real situation. Furthermore, if the function
has some complex loops which depends on the inputs for the
function, the execution times of each opcode are uncertain. In
this case, solc will give an estimate of ’infinite’, and users have
to set the gas limit with manually analysis, which is not correct.
As mentioned in the later experiments, we detect out-of-gas
vulnerabilities in 25 contracts out of the 255 tested contracts.
Answer to RQ-a: The results of current gas estimation
tools can lead to a large number of out-of-gas occur-
rences. Out-of-gas error is indeed a potential threat.
B. GasFuzz Performance
In order to answer the second question, we evaluated
GasFuzz with those functions and ran each function with 5
minutes. The results are shown in Figure 7. According to the
relationship among the results of GasFuzz and solc and real
gas cost, we divide the transactions into three intervals. As
shown in Fig. 7, the first interval represents the results of
GasFuzz are smaller than solc and real gas cost, the second
interval represents the results of GasFuzz are between solc’s
result and real gas cost, and the third one represents the results
of GasFuzz are larger than solc and real gas cost. The red bars
in the figure represent that, within this interval, solc’s result
is smaller than the real gas consumption and would definitely
result in out-of-gas error, the blue bar represents that although
the solc’s result is larger than real consumption, but would still
be potentially attacked by the inputs generated by GasFuzz,
especially in the third interval.
The figure shows that GasFuzz can exceed the actual gas
cost in 634 transactions (493+17+124) of the 225 contracts,
counts for 86.14% of all transactions. In these transactions,
if user sets gas limit according to results of GasFuzz not the
solc, out-of-gas problems might be successfully avoided. As
we illustrated in the formal section, the results of solc exceed
the real gas consumption on only 22.55% of the transactions.
If GasFuzz is used for gas limit settings, the risk of out-of-
gas occurring in these transactions will be greatly reduced,
from 44.02% to 13.86%.
Fig. 7: GasFuzz results compared with results of solc and the
real gas consumption in the transaction
We use the 8 illustrative examples in the formal subsection
to observe the effectiveness of GasFuzz. The results are
shown in Table III. Column GasFuzz represents the results of
maximum gas given by GasFuzz in 5 minutes. Column Time
shows how long it takes for GasFuzz to find the maximum gas
cost. The last two columns show the increase ratio of gas cost
given by GasFuzz compared with solc and the real situation.
We could find in the table that, GasFuzz could generate
inputs to trigger a gas which is higher than the estimation
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TABLE III: GasFuzz results on the 8 functions
Contract GasFuzz Time /solc /real
BAToken 25879 0.542 -40.5% 18.08%
DSTokenBase 53179 1.949 21.08% 43.05%
Dogg 55072 0.583 21.80% 4.23%
AccessoryData 49601 0.224 18.32% -0.43%
ENIGMA 26949 8.496 / 4.90%
KittyItemMarket 116324 0.417 / 2.18%
CommunityChest 32884 0.173 / 1.11%
Future1Exchange 32991 0.389 / 4.79%
result of solc by 20% on average. Except for the contract
AccessorData, GasFuzz’s results are higher than the maximum
value of real transactions. For the contract BAToken, GasFuzz
gives a lower result than solc, we will explain the reason below.
For the contract AccessoryData, the gas consumption is lower
than the real value by only 0.43% which means GasFuzz’s
result is very closed to the real value. If the user sets the gas
limit with the estimation result by solc, 7 of the contracts are in
dangerous of out-of-gas error. However, with GasFuzz’s result,
only one of the contract may occur out-of-gas error.
Besides the real out-of-gas situations in these transactions,
some of the transactions face potential out-of-gas errors. A
potential out-of-gas means the limit of some successfully
executing transactions is actually not proper in some other
situations. Figure 8 shows the relationship between the results
of GasFuzz on the 8 functions and fuzzing time. As the figure
shows, GasFuzz could approach or even exceed the real gas
used in the transaction, which means some of the functions
have potential our-of-gas error. With the inputs generated by
GasFuzz, out-of-gas errors may occur. We will use 3 functions
as examples to illustrate the three types of inputs that GasFuzz
generated within 5 minutes as below.
GasFuzz exceeds the results of solc and the real gas cost
in the transaction. The first function we focused on is transfer
taken from the contract Dogg. This function is used to transfer
some ether to some other addresses. This function needs two
parameters: to and value. The first is the destination address
and the second is the amount of tokens to be transferred. The
function is shown as the following:
1 function transfer
2 (address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success)
3 {
4 _transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
5 return true;
6 }
’msg.sender’ in function’ _transfer’ represents the caller of the
transaction. This a state variable used in Ethereum. GasFuzz
finds three different inputs for this function. At 0.32 seconds,
GasFuzz generates an input that could cost 25603 gas units.
At 0.49 seconds, another input is generated cost 25607 units
of gas. After 0.58 seconds, GasFuzz finds an input to cost
55072 units if gas. This result is higher than the real gas cost
in the transaction based on this function, which is 52835 units.
This means there may be potential out-of-gas errors in these
transactions when given the inputs generated by GasFuzz.
This situation occurred 28 of the 30 transactions based on
eight contracts mentioned above. As for all the transactions we
used in our experiment, 69.29% of them have this situation.
In this situation, if the user used solc to set the gas limit of
the transaction ,there is a chance that out-of-gas error could
occur. In this situation, user could just set the gas limit as a
value which is a little larger than the result of GasFuzz.
GasFuzz exceeds results of solc but is lower than
the real gas cost in the transaction. The second function
we focused on is ’addSERAPHIM’ from the contract ’Ac-
cessoryData’. The function is listed as the following. The
function is used to add a new seraphim to the system. The
’onlyCREATOR’ is a modifier used to limit the scope of the
executor of the function. The function first check whether the
new seraphim is a new one, then it add the number of the
seraphims by one.
1 function addSERAPHIM(address _newSeraphim)
2 onlyCREATOR public {
3 if (seraphims[_newSeraphim] == false) {
4 seraphims[_newSeraphim] = true;
5 totalSeraphims += 1;
6 }
7 }
GasFuzz gives two gas consumption results for this func-
tion. At 0.135 second, GasFuzz find a set of inputs that could
cost 48937 units of gas. At 0.224 second, GasFuzz gives
another gas consumption result of 49601 units. Solc gives a
result of 41921 gas units for this function. However, in the real
transaction, 49816 units of gas have been consumed. GasFuzz
find a result better than solc but lower than the real situation.
The reason that GasFuzz may not find the worst case for gas
consumption may be the time for fuzzing. If we ran the tool
with more time, maybe it will give us a higher result. However,
this result is higher than the one of solc, which means the risks
of out-of-gas error are decreased with the help of GasFuzz.
GasFuzz exceeds the real gas cost but is lower than the
estimation result by solc. The last function we focused on is
transfer in BAToken.sol. This function is listed as follows.
1 function transfer
2 (address _to, uint256 _value) returns (bool success)
3 {
4 if (balances[msg.sender] >= _value && _value > 0)
5 {
6 ...
7 Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
8 return true;
9 }
10 else
11 return false;
12 }
Solc predicts that 43517 gas units would be charged while
GasFuzz gives a result of 25879 gas units which is lower than
the estimation of solc. To find out the reason for the under
estimation, we made a thorough analysis of this result. The
following codes are extracted from the opcode sequences of
the execution.
1 {"pc":1420,"op":85,"gas":"0xffffaa6c","gasCost":"0x0",
2 "stack":["0xd356a28b","0x1f8","0x0","0x1","0x1000000000000
3 0000000000000000000000000000","0x0"],
4 "depth":0,"opName":"SSTORE"}
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(a) GasFuzz on
BAToken.sol
(b) GasFuzz on
DSTokenBase.sol
(c) GasFuzz on
Dogg.sol
(d) GasFuzz on
AccessoryData.sol
(e) GasFuzz on
ENIGMA.sol
(f) GasFuzz on
KittyItemMarket.sol
(g) GasFuzz on
CommunityChest.sol
(h) GasFuzz on
Future1Exchange.sol
Fig. 8: GasFuzz on 8 functions. GasFuzz exceeds the gas estimation results given by solc on 7 functions. GasFuzz also
exceeds the real maximum gas cost on 7 functions. This means with the input generated by GasFuzz an out-of-gas error may
occur in these transactions.
’SSTORE’ is an opcode used to store a data in the memory.
The opcode takes two parameters from the stack. The first
element is the value that needs storing. The second element is
the address that the value is stored at. As for this example, the
value ’0x10000000000000000000000000000000000000000’
is the address and the value ’0x0’ is the value stored at
this address. As stated in the Ethereum yellow paper[26],
the SSTORE opcode will give a gas refund if it changes
some non-zero value to a zero value in some address. The
refund gas is half the gas used before, which could not exceed
15,000. In our example, the gas used before is 43,517. So
the refund gas is 15,000. solc gas estimation did not consider
the refunding, which leads to a higher gas estimation. In this
situation, GasFUzz gives a more accurate result than solc
which is also higher than the real transaction costs. As we
mentioned in Section II, fewer gas limit settings mean faster
execution. Besides, excessive gas estimates are also dangerous
because attackers can exploit the gas loss.
Answer to RQ-b: The out-of-gas errors could be effec-
tively avoid with the help of GasFuzz. GasFuzz is capable
of generating inputs that approximate or exceed the real
gas cost of the transaction in smart contract, and reduce
the under estimation of solc dramatically.
C. GasFuzz Engine
GasFuzz is a feedback-directed fuzzing method. However,
some other feedback-directed fuzzing tools could also be easily
used in this problem. We compared GasFuzz with two other
fuzzing tools: SlowFuzz [52] and PerfFuzz [40]. SlowFuzz
provides a fuzzing method to detect algorithmic complexity
vulnerabilities for C/C++ programs. SlowFuzz uses resource-
usage-guided evolutionary search techniques to automatically
find inputs that maximize computational resource utilization
for a given application. Similar to SlowFuzz, PerfFuzz gener-
ates inputs via feedback-directed mutational fuzzing. PerfFuzz
uses multi-dimensional feedback and independently maximizes
execution counts for all program locations.
1) Implementations for Gas Used Problem.: In order to
apply the fuzzing tools mentioned above, based on their open-
source version, we customize their feedback mechanisms for
fuzzing smart contracts. SlowFuzz retains the seeds that could
maximize the total path of program execution. While PerfFuzz
retains seeds that could lead to more execution of an edge in
the program CFG. In our customization, we use the same CFG
as GasFuzz. For SlowFuzz, we calculated the execution times
for each edge in the CFG during an execution. And the total
length of path is represented as the sum of execution times for
all edges. As for PerfFuzz, we record the maximum execution
times for each edge in the CFG. If a seed could execute some
edges more than the times recorded as the maximum value, it
will be reserved.
2) Comparison among Different Fuzzing engines.: We
compared GasFuzz with the fuzzing tools as well as a ran-
dom fuzzing engine. The random engine save all the seeds
randomly without any feedback information. The comparison
is committed on the 736 transactions we took. The result of
the comparison is shown in TableIV.
TABLE IV: The number of transactions that each fuzzer can
maximize the gas estimation compared with other engines
PerFuzz RnadomFuzz SlowFuzz GasFuzz
total 628 644 623 722
percentage 85.1% 87.3% 84.4% 97.8%
GasFuzz performs the best in 97.8% of the transactions
compared with other fuzzing engines, which is the best among
all of the engines. RandomFuzz performs better than the other
two fuzzing engines with a ratio of 87.3%. The reason for
this result may be that the directed strategies used in Perfuzz
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TABLE V: Performance of each fuzzer on 8 smart contracts
PerFuzz RandomFuzz SlowFuzz GasFuzz
Result(unit) Time(s) GasRate Result(unit) Time(s) GasRate Result(unit) Time(s) GasRate Result(unit) Time(s) GasRate
BAToken 25879 0.712 36347 25879 3.012 8592 25879 2.166 11948 25879 0.542 47747
DSTokenBase 53179 2.412 22048 53179 1.904 27930 53179 0.579 91846 53179 1.949 27285
Dogg 55072 4.457 12356 25667 2.287 11223 55008 2.549 21580 55072 0.583 94463
AccessoryData 49601 0.704 70456 49601 2.315 21426 49601 1.467 33811 49601 0.224 221433
ENIGMA 26949 52.246 516 26693 60.543 441 26565 3.751 7082 26949 8.496 3172
KittyItemMarket 116196 2.522 46073 116196 0.546 212813 116324 1.681 69199 116324 0.417 278954
CommunityChest 32884 0.426 77192 32884 158.368 208 32820 0.651 50415 32884 0.173 190081
Future1Exchange 32991 1.234 26735 32991 1.601 20606 32991 0.767 43013 32991 0.389 84810
and SlowFuzz are not suitable for this problem. Maximizing
the execution times for each edge or the total length of the
execution path may lead to a highest gas cost brought by the
opcodes. However, the gas consumption of a transaction also
contains the gas cost brought by data storing. For this reason,
the fuzzing engines in PerFuzz and SlowFuzz are not ideal
in this problem. In order to observe the difference among the
four engines more specifically, we count the fuzz results of
the four engines on the eight contracts we mentioned above.
The results are shown in TableV. In the table, we introduce a
new concept called ’GasRate’. Its definition is shown in the
following formula:
GasRate = Result/T ime
This variable is used to measure the effectiveness of the
fuzz engine. If this tool can find higher gas consumption
in less time, which means a higher GasRate, we think the
effectiveness of this engine is better than others. As the table
shows, GasFuzz has a highest GasRate on 6 contracts. GasFuzz
finds the highest gas cost among four engines on all of the
8 contracts. GasFuzz can find the best results in a relatively
short period of time. We now use the contract ’ENIGMA’ to
show the fuzzing process of these fuzzing engines. We chose
the contract ’ENIGMA’ because the 4 engines gives many
gas consumption results of function ’Activate’ in this contract
which could clearly show the trend of the results of the 4
engines in the process of fuzzing. The results of 4 fuzzing
engines are shown in Fig9.
Fig. 9: Trend of results given by 4 fuzzing engines on
function ’Activate’ from contract ’ENIGMA’
As we could see from the figure, GasFuzz could reach a
high result in a short time which is 8.5 seconds to be precisely.
PerFuzz gives the same result as GasFuzz at 52.24 seconds.
SlowFuzz and RandomFuzz performs worse than the other two
engines even with more than 5 minutes.
Answer to RQ-c: GasFuzz performs better than some
well used feedback-directed fuzzing engines in this prob-
lem, where the gas weighted control flow graph and
the gas directed seed selection and mutation strategies
contribute to the improvements.
D. Practical Applications
GasFuzz aims at generating a set of inputs that could trigger
a high gas cost. It can be useful for different practical purposes,
and we evaluate GasFuzz for two potential applications.
1) Gas Estimation and Limit Setting: Choosing a proper
gas limit for each transaction is a tough problem. Many works
introduced in Section 7 focus on solve this problem in different
ways. GasFuzz could also be used to estimate the gas limit of
a transaction. To our best knowledge, except for solc, we are
the second publicity available tool 1. The popular solc often
generates ‘infinite’ estimation or under estimation. GasFuzz
could give a more accurate result as presented in Table III.
2) Gas Related Vulnerabilities Detection: Another appli-
cation of GasFuzz is to detect gas related vulnerabilities. A
transaction with a gas cost that exceeds the gas limit will be
reverted. Malicious attackers may exposure a set of inputs to
trigger a loop to consume plenty of gas. As a result, the service
provided by the contract is stopped. Such vulnerabilities may
cause a loss of money. The following code
1 function transfer
2 (address[] _address, uint256[] _values) onlyOwner public {
3 require(_address.length == _values.length);
4 for (uint i = 0; i < _address.length; i += 1) {
5 token.transfer(_address[i],_values[i]); }
6 AirDroppedTokens(_address.length);
7 }
is fetched from a real-world smart contract. This function is
used to transfer some ether to some accounts. Attackers may
create a bunch of address to cause a denial of service attack to
this contract. The transfer function in the loop may be executed
for many times and cost plenty of gas. As a result, the gas
1http://github-xxxx-xxx, hidden for double blind review and would be
open after review process
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used exceed the gas limit of a block and the transaction would
revert.
GasFuzz could generate a set of inputs which identifies this
problem. This previously unknown issue has been assigned
with a CVE ID. We have already detected 25 confirmed out-
of-gas vulnerabilities with the help of GasFuzz, 5 of which
have been assigned unique CVE identifiers in the US National
Vulnerability Database and other 20 are appended for approval.
Answer to RQ-d: GasFuzz has practical values and is
really helpful in gas estimation tasks as well as in looking
for gas-related vulnerabilities.
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Mutation and selection strategies limitations. The muta-
tion strategies of GasFuzz are hybrid for the current version.
They are designed based on the mutation strategies in AFL.
GasFuzz uses some global functions to represent the envi-
ronment variables. For mutations, these variables are given
different values randomly on the basis of their types. This
mutation strategy performed correctly for GasFuzz. However,
more efficient mutation strategies for environment variables
could be adapted to GasFuzz to build a more complex envi-
ronment for the contract to run. A more complex environment
means more accounts and more state information, it may
lead to some different behaviours of smart contracts. Second,
even we have implemented MCMC in the seed selection, we
will still face the local optimization problem, which needs
to be solved with more efficient algorithms or improve the
reservation probability for none-interesting seed .
Smart contracts support limitations. The current pro-
totype of GasFuzz could not deal with the smart contract
functions that call another contract deployed on some address
in Ethereum. The gas cost of these functions determined
by the called contract, which could not be calculated by
GasFuzz for now. This problem may be solved by fetching
the called contract and making a relationship between these
two contracts. We will try to make GasFuzz adapted to these
kinds of contracts in our future work.
Data collection limitations. One of the subjective threats is
the data collection of the experiment. The experimental process
contains a large amount of data, and there are often some
errors in the statistics and analysis phases. In order to solve this
problem, we use fully automated script files to statistics and
analyze the data. To a certain extent, script files could avoid
the impact of the data collection process on the experimental
results. Another possible subjective threats of this experiment
is the time of fuzzing process. The result of fuzzing technique
depends on the duration time sometimes. More fuzzing time
may give a larger result of gas costs.
VI. RELATED WORK
Gas cost estimation. Solc [28] provides an api to estimate
the gas cost of the functions of contracts as showed in Section
5. However, the estimation way of solc has a lot of constraints
which lead to many ‘infinite’ estimations and under estima-
tions. GASTAP [2] infers sound gas upper bounds for all public
functions in a smart contracts with complex transformation
and analysis processes on the code. Matteo Marescotti [45]
have presented a solution to the problem of estimating the gas
consumption for Ethereum smart contracts based on techniques
inspired by bounded model-checking techniques. These works
contribute lots of premiere ideas for further research, but none
are publicity available except for Solc.
Security of Ethereum and Smart contracts. Security of
Ethereum and smart contracts is essential to the development
of blockchain technique. Some works make a survey on the
attacks of Ethereum and smart contracts [5]. Plenty of research
focus on Ethereum and smart contract security. For example,
echidna [21] provides a fuzzing framework for developers to
check if there is any problem in their contracts. It takes a list of
invariants (properties that should always remain true) as input.
For each invariant, it generates random sequences of calls to
the contract and checks if the invariant holds. ContractFuzzer
[38] defines some oracles to detect vulnerabilities in smart con-
tracts such as dangerous delegate bugs. Vandal [11] presents
a security analysis framework for Ethereum smart contracts.
Another recent work[35] gives the first complete small-step
semantics of EVM bytecode. This formalization relies on a
combination of hyper and safety properties. MadMax [34]
classifies and identifies gas-focused vulnerabilities, and present
a static program analysis technique to automatically detect gas-
focused vulnerabilities with very high confidence. EVMFuzz
[32] uses differential testing to fuzz different versions of EVM
and try to find out the vulnerabilities in EVM. Our another
work EVM* provides a framework to make a reinforcement
on EVM [43] to test whether there is a dangerous operation
during transaction execution and stop the dangerous transaction
in time.
Performance problems detection. A lot of work has been
done to detect the waste of gas and the optimazation pattern for
gas consumption. For example, a recent work [15] identifies 24
anti-patterns from the execution traces of real smart contracts.
Besides, they design and develop GasReducer, the first tool to
automatically detect all these anti-patterns from the bytecode
of smart contracts and replace them with efficient code through
bytecode-to-bytecode optimization. Their another work [14]
proposes an emulation-based framework to automatically mea-
sure the resource consumptions of EVM operations.
Fuzzing tools. Traditional fuzzing techniques aims at find-
ing memory safety problems. Fuzzing testing could be divided
as mutation based fuzzing and generation based fuzzing.
Mutation based fuzzing such as AFL[33], mutates seeds with
mutation strategies for each fuzzing process. Generation based
fuzzing generate inputs based on the domain knowledge of
the program. Some works focus on the improvement of AFL
to increase the fuzzing performance. Enfuzz[16] proposes a
method to combine several fuzzers to work together and share
the seeds with each other. Pafl[41] utilizes efficient guiding
information synchronization and task division to extend those
existing fuzzing optimizations of single mode to industrial
parallel mode. Safl[55] focuses on the combination of symbolic
execution and fuzzing testing tools to increase the coverage.
Some other works focus on the techniques to find the weakness
of fuzzing techniques, such as Anti-fuzz[25]. Their results
show that it is relatively easy to implement and apply anti-
fuzzing techniques that are able to completely mask crashes
and, by extension, vulnerabilities from fuzzers. However this
is hard to implement in smart contracts deployed on Ethereum,
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because the contracts on Ethereum could not be changed since
it is deployed.
Main difference. For the gas estimation tools, GasFuzz
focuses on generating inputs to trigger a high gas consumption.
Besides, in section V, we demonstrated GasFuzz could per-
form better than the related avaiable tools. For the traditional
fuzzing tools aimed at smart contracts, GasFuzz uses different
mutation strategies and detect different vulnerabilities. Echidna
and ContractFuzzer randomly mutates the inputs for each
generation, while GasFuzz combines the strategies of AFL
and the randomly methods for environment variables. Besides,
GasFuzz aims at generating inputs trigger a high gas cost but
not detecting the memory safety bugs. As for the performance
bug detection tools, GasFuzz could automatically find the
bottleneck of gas cost for a smart contract, either for gas limit
reference or vulnerability detection. The previous works aim
at C/C++ programs or artificially define some optimization or
known patterns for smart contracts.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed GasFuzz, a fuzzing approach
to generate inputs that could lead to a high gas consumption,
which can be used to reduce the under estimation ratio of
existing tools and the detect previously unknown out-of-gas
vulnerabilities. First, GasFuzz will generate a W-CFG for the
function. Second, GasFuzz uses feedback-directed selection
and mutation strategies. Finally, GasFuzz provides an envi-
ronment for contract transaction. The result demonstrates that
GasFuzz could successfully generate some inputs to trigger
high gas cost in a short time. In 86.14% of the transactions, the
gas cost given by GasFuzz is higher than the gas cost of real-
world transactions or values estimated by solc, which could
successfully decrease the risk of out-of-gas error, from 44.02%
to 13.86% of all transactions. For the practical application of
GasFuzz, we evaluate GasFuzz on more real-world contracts
and detect 25 previously unknown gas-related vulnerabilities,
and 5 of which are assigned with CVE Ids.
Our future work will focus on the optimization of GasFuzz.
We will design some gas-related mutators, accelerate the
fuzzing procedure with some static analysis such as the result
of solc, and try to detect more gas-related vulnerabilities in
smart contracts with GasFuzz. Besides, we would like to find
some gas hot spots with the help of GasFuzz and try to design
some patterns to optimize the gas cost of these spots.
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